The Future of Biosecurity
AI, synthetic biology, cloud labs, and global connectivity are converging to create unprecedented biological risks and unprecedented defensive capabilities within the same decade. Three scenarios bracket the future: muddling through is most likely, pandemic prevention is achievable with sustained effort, catastrophic failure remains possible if governance lags technology. The outcome depends on decisions we make now.
- Analyze emerging trends that will shape biosecurity over the next decade
- Evaluate different future scenarios for biological risk and security
- Identify the key uncertainties that will determine which futures materialize
- Develop a personal framework for contributing to biosecurity resilience
- Synthesize lessons from this handbook into an actionable worldview
Introduction: A Field at an Inflection Point
We have covered a lot of ground in this handbook. From the foundations of biosecurity to the pathogens of concern, from AI’s dual-use potential to building a biosecurity career, we have tried to provide a comprehensive foundation for understanding and contributing to this field.
Now we turn to the hardest question: What comes next?
Prediction is difficult, especially about the future. But biosecurity demands that we try. The decisions we make now, about research governance, technology investment, institutional design, and international cooperation, will shape outcomes for decades. Making those decisions well requires thinking carefully about where we are headed.
This chapter offers three things:
- An assessment of converging trends that will shape biosecurity over the next 5-15 years
- A set of scenarios that bracket the range of possible futures
- A call to action for readers who want to contribute to better outcomes
I write this with humility. History repeatedly surprises us. The specific predictions in this chapter will likely be wrong in important ways. But the exercise of thinking through possibilities, identifying key uncertainties, and developing adaptive strategies is essential regardless of whether we guess right.
This is not an academic exercise. The same technologies that could enable the next pandemic could also help us prevent it. The same capabilities that could be weaponized could be turned toward early detection and rapid response. We are in a race, and the outcome is not predetermined.
The Converging Forces
AI + Biology: The Defining Intersection
Throughout this handbook, we have examined the intersection of AI and biology from multiple angles. The trend is clear: these domains are converging, and the convergence is accelerating.
What is happening:
| Domain | Current State | 5-Year Trajectory |
|---|---|---|
| Protein structure prediction | AlphaFold solved a 50-year problem | Routine design of novel proteins with desired functions |
| Pathogen genomics | Real-time sequencing during outbreaks | Predictive models identifying pandemic potential before spillover |
| Drug discovery | AI accelerating candidate identification | End-to-end AI-driven discovery to clinical candidate |
| Lab automation | Cloud labs executing protocols remotely | Autonomous research agents designing and running experiments |
| Biosurveillance | AI processing open-source signals | Fusion of genomic, syndromic, and social data for early warning |
The dual-use tension: Every capability on this list has both defensive and offensive implications. AI that predicts pandemic potential could also identify features to engineer. Autonomous labs that accelerate drug discovery could also synthesize dangerous agents. Biosurveillance that detects outbreaks could also track individuals.
This dual-use tension is not new, but AI amplifies it. The same models, the same data, the same infrastructure serve both purposes. Governance must operate in this reality.
The Democratization Trajectory
Biology is becoming more accessible. This trend predates AI but is accelerated by it.
Historical progression:
- 1970s-1990s: Genetic engineering requires PhD training, institutional access, significant funding
- 2000s-2010s: DIY bio emerges; gene synthesis becomes commercially available; costs drop exponentially
- 2020s: AI provides “PhD-equivalent assistance” for some tasks; cloud labs enable remote experimentation; information barriers erode
What this means for biosecurity:
The tacit knowledge barrier that historically protected against biological attacks is eroding. As we saw in the Aum Shinrikyo case, that barrier held in the 1990s. Whether it will hold in the 2030s, when AI can provide step-by-step guidance and cloud labs can execute protocols without hands-on expertise, is one of the key uncertainties for biosecurity.
Some biosecurity researchers worry about a specific scenario: an AI system could “uplift” an otherwise incapable actor to execute a sophisticated biological attack. This would represent a step-change in risk, as the limiting factor would shift from technical capability to intent.
We do not yet have strong evidence that current AI systems provide meaningful uplift for biological attacks. But the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. The capabilities are evolving rapidly, and red-teaming to date has been limited.
Geopolitical Fragmentation
The biosecurity regime that emerged after World War II, anchored in the Biological Weapons Convention and supported by US global leadership, assumed a degree of international cooperation that may no longer be sustainable.
Current challenges:
- Great power competition: US-China tensions affect everything from research collaboration to WHO governance
- Weakening multilateralism: Treaty regimes face erosion; new agreements are harder to achieve
- Dual-use technology transfer: AI and biology tools flow across borders; export controls are porous
- Pandemic politicization: COVID-19 origins debate demonstrates how outbreaks can become geopolitical weapons
Implications:
If international cooperation weakens further, many biosecurity strategies become harder to implement. Coordinated surveillance, joint investigations, harmonized research governance, and collective response all depend on countries working together. The biosecurity community must consider how to maintain essential cooperation even in a more competitive geopolitical environment.
The Window of Vulnerability
There is a window, perhaps lasting another 5-15 years, during which offensive biological capabilities may advance faster than defensive capabilities.
The asymmetry:
| Factor | Favors Offense | Favors Defense |
|---|---|---|
| Technology development | Novel pathogens can be created faster than countermeasures developed | AI accelerates both, but detection is harder than creation |
| Regulatory lag | Attackers ignore regulations | Defenders must work within governance frameworks |
| Attribution | Biological attacks are harder to attribute than cyber or kinetic | Improving forensics and surveillance narrow the gap |
| Deterrence | Uncertain attribution undermines deterrence | Building attribution capabilities strengthens it |
The goal: Close this window before a catastrophic event occurs. This requires sustained investment, international cooperation, and technological innovation applied to defense.
Scenarios for the Next Decade
Rather than predict a single future, it is more useful to consider a range of scenarios. These are not forecasts but rather tools for thinking about key uncertainties and their implications.
Scenario 1: Muddling Through (Most Likely)
What happens: Progress continues incrementally. Some governance measures are implemented; others stall. Occasional biological incidents occur but none reach catastrophic scale. International cooperation is uneven but not entirely absent. The biosecurity community grows but remains under-resourced relative to the challenge.
Key features:
- AI-bio governance develops slowly, primarily in the US and Europe
- DNA synthesis screening becomes more widespread but not universal
- Cloud lab oversight improves but significant gaps remain
- One or two novel pathogen outbreaks occur, but containment succeeds after initial failures
- No biological weapon use, but several close calls or foiled attempts
- Attribution capabilities improve but remain inadequate for confident assignment of responsibility
- Investment in pandemic preparedness spikes after events, then declines
Why this is most likely: It reflects the most common pattern in public policy history. Crisis triggers response; response is imperfect; complacency returns until next crisis. This pattern has characterized biosecurity since the 2001 anthrax attacks.
What it means for practitioners: The window for action exists, but it is constrained. Progress requires working within imperfect systems, building coalitions where possible, and being ready to capitalize on crisis-driven windows of opportunity.
Scenario 2: Pandemic Prevention Achieved
What happens: Sustained investment, technological breakthroughs, and international cooperation combine to create a robust pandemic prevention architecture. The 100 Days Mission becomes reality. A major natural outbreak occurs but is contained before spreading globally. No biological attacks succeed; attempts are detected and interdicted.
Key features:
- Metagenomic surveillance detects novel pathogens within days of emergence
- AI-enabled vaccine platforms deliver countermeasures within weeks
- Global manufacturing capacity ensures rapid deployment
- DNA synthesis screening is universal and effective
- AI model governance prevents information hazards while enabling beneficial research
- Lab safety standards are harmonized internationally
- Attribution capabilities deter state programs; non-state actors lack capability
Why this is achievable: The technologies exist or are in development. The investments required, while substantial, are small relative to COVID-19 costs. The institutional models exist (see Red-Teaming AI Systems for Biosecurity Risks). This scenario requires sustained political will, not technological miracles.
What it means for practitioners: This is the scenario we should be working toward. Every investment in surveillance, every improvement in governance, every expansion of the biosecurity workforce moves us closer to this outcome.
The Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI) has articulated the goal of developing safe, effective vaccines against any new pathogen within 100 days of identification. This would compress the timeline from the 326 days for the first COVID-19 vaccine to a period short enough to prevent pandemic-scale spread.
Achieving this requires pre-positioned platform technologies, pre-established manufacturing capacity, pre-approved regulatory pathways, and pre-planned distribution systems. It is ambitious but not impossible.
Scenario 3: Catastrophic Failure
What happens: A major biological event, whether natural spillover, laboratory accident, or deliberate attack, causes mass casualties and global disruption. Governance fails to prevent or adequately respond. International cooperation collapses. The world is fundamentally changed.
Key features:
- A novel pathogen with high transmissibility and high mortality spreads globally before detection
- Medical countermeasures are inadequate or too slow to deploy
- Health systems are overwhelmed; societal functions break down in affected regions
- Attribution is contested or impossible; geopolitical blame-casting intensifies
- International institutions lose legitimacy; countries turn inward
- Economic damage dwarfs COVID-19; recovery takes decades
- Biological weapons programs proliferate as states seek deterrence
Why this is possible: The vulnerabilities exist. The SARS-CoV-2 origins debate shows how easily an outbreak can become a geopolitical flashpoint. The 1977 H1N1 case shows that laboratory accidents can cause pandemics. The Soviet program shows that states can hide massive biological weapons efforts.
What it means for practitioners: This scenario is not inevitable. Every measure that improves detection, speeds response, strengthens governance, or builds international cooperation makes it less likely. The goal is to ensure it remains a scenario we study rather than a history we live through.
Key Uncertainties
Several key uncertainties will determine which scenario materializes. These are the questions that current evidence cannot answer but that will be resolved, one way or another, over the coming years.
Will AI Lower Barriers Faster Than Defenses Improve?
The central question for AI-bio biosecurity. Current AI systems have not demonstrably enabled attacks that would otherwise be impossible. But capabilities are advancing rapidly. Red-teaming efforts provide some insight but cannot fully anticipate what future systems might enable.
Optimistic view: AI-enabled defenses (surveillance, diagnostics, countermeasure development) will advance faster than AI-enabled offense. The defender’s advantage will be preserved or enhanced.
Pessimistic view: Information is asymmetric; a single successful attack design can be shared, while defensive capabilities must be built institution by institution. Offense benefits from AI sooner.
What to watch: Results of red-teaming evaluations. Performance of AI-enabled biosurveillance systems. Progress on the 100 Days Mission. Evidence (or absence) of AI-assisted biological incidents.
Will International Cooperation Survive?
Biosecurity requires countries to share surveillance data, coordinate research governance, and respond jointly to outbreaks. This cooperation depends on at least minimal trust and functional international institutions.
Optimistic view: Shared threat perception drives cooperation despite geopolitical competition. COVID-19’s costs create sustained political will for pandemic prevention.
Pessimistic view: Great power competition deepens. International institutions weaken. Countries pursue national biosecurity in ways that undermine global preparedness.
What to watch: WHO governance reforms. Progress (or lack thereof) on BWC strengthening. Bilateral and multilateral biosecurity agreements. Response to future outbreaks.
Will Investment Be Sustained?
Pandemic preparedness investment typically spikes after events and then declines as memories fade and competing priorities emerge. This “panic and neglect” cycle undermines sustained capability building.
Optimistic view: COVID-19’s unprecedented impact creates lasting institutional and political commitment. New funding mechanisms (like CEPI’s sustainable financing model) break the cycle.
Pessimistic view: The pattern repeats. By 2030, pandemic preparedness budgets have returned to pre-COVID levels. The investments made in 2021-2023 have not been sustained.
What to watch: Annual appropriations for CDC, BARDA, international health security. Private sector investment in pandemic preparedness technologies. Political salience of biosecurity issues.
Will the Biosecurity Community Grow Sufficiently?
Biosecurity is understaffed relative to the challenge. The field needs scientists, policy experts, technologists, lawyers, ethicists, and practitioners across many domains.
Optimistic view: Increased awareness attracts talent. New training programs expand the pipeline. Funding enables career paths that retain experienced practitioners.
Pessimistic view: Competition from other fields (AI safety, climate) diverts talent. Funding constraints limit positions. Burnout drives experienced practitioners away.
What to watch: Enrollment in biosecurity programs. Fellowship and grant funding trends. Career outcomes for biosecurity graduates. Diversity and geographic distribution of the community.
What It Will Take
Moving toward the “Pandemic Prevention Achieved” scenario and away from “Catastrophic Failure” requires action across multiple domains. Here I pull together what this handbook has laid out.
Sustained Investment
What is needed:
- Annual preparedness funding comparable to defense spending (recognizing that pandemics pose comparable national security risks)
- Continued support for BARDA, CEPI, and international pandemic preparedness financing
- Infrastructure investment in surveillance, manufacturing, and response capacity
- Research funding for fundamental virology, immunology, and countermeasure development
- Workforce development including training programs, fellowships, and career pathways
The benchmark: World Bank analysis suggests that $10.5 billion annually in additional spending could significantly reduce pandemic risk. This is less than 0.1% of global GDP and a fraction of COVID-19’s costs.
National Leadership as Pandemic Security
Global mechanisms provide guidance and surge capacity, but preparedness succeeds or fails at the national level. Countries that performed best in early COVID-19 response shared a common feature: they had learned from prior outbreaks and maintained standing capabilities rather than building them during a crisis.
What “country-led” preparedness requires:
- Embedded financing: Routine budget lines for surveillance, laboratory capacity, emergency operations, and workforce, not crisis-driven supplemental funding
- Institutional authority: Public health agencies or national CDCs with clear mandates that survive political transitions
- Operational capacity: Emergency operation centers that integrate disease surveillance, medical countermeasure logistics, and clinical care coordination
- Trust infrastructure: Community engagement and risk communication systems developed before emergencies
The economic case is clear. COVID-19 is estimated to have cost the United States alone approximately $16 trillion in combined economic losses, premature deaths, and long-term health impacts (Cutler & Summers, JAMA 2020). The World Bank estimates that building and maintaining core preparedness capacities costs $10-11 billion per year globally.
Global financing mechanisms now exist to support this shift. The Pandemic Fund, established in 2022 by WHO and the World Bank, has awarded approximately $885 million in grants across two funding rounds to low- and lower-middle-income countries, mobilizing an additional $6 billion in co-financing. The IMF’s Resilience and Sustainability Trust provides long-term financing with preparedness conditions. WHO’s HEPR framework defines five core capacity areas: surveillance, clinical care, protecting communities, access to medical countermeasures, and emergency operations.
Yet these mechanisms complement, not replace, national investment. The limiting factor is political will to sustain preparedness between crises (Van Kerkhove & Ihekweazu, 2025).
Technology Development
Priority areas:
| Technology | Current State | Goal |
|---|---|---|
| Metagenomic surveillance | Deployed in some settings | Universal coverage, real-time integration |
| Broad-spectrum antivirals | Few approved agents | Arsenal against major viral families |
| Rapid vaccine platforms | mRNA demonstrated during COVID | 100 Days Mission achieved |
| DNA synthesis screening | Industry standard, gaps in coverage | Universal, evasion-resistant |
| AI biosecurity tools | Emerging | Integrated into research governance |
Governance Innovation
What is needed:
- Updated frameworks for dual-use research oversight that account for AI
- International coordination on AI-bio governance (Model Nanjing Treaty concepts)
- Strengthened laboratory biosafety and biosecurity standards
- Improved attribution capabilities and international investigation mechanisms
- Private sector engagement and accountability
The challenge: Governance must adapt faster than technology evolves, which inverts the historical pattern.
International Cooperation
Priority mechanisms:
- Strengthen WHO and the International Health Regulations
- Build Australia Group-style coordination for AI-bio technologies
- Develop regional biosecurity cooperation frameworks
- Create pathways for great power dialogue on biological risks
- Support capacity building in lower-resource settings
The key insight: Pathogens do not respect borders. A surveillance failure in one country becomes a global threat. Cooperation is not altruism; it is self-interest.
A Call to Action
This handbook began with a fundamental premise: biosecurity is too important to be left to a small community of specialists. The challenges are too complex, the stakes too high, and the need for diverse perspectives too great.
If you have made it this far, you have the knowledge foundation to contribute. What remains is the decision to act.
For Scientists and Engineers
Your technical expertise is essential. The biosecurity field needs people who understand:
- How pathogens work and how to defend against them
- How AI systems function and how to govern them
- How laboratory systems operate and how to make them safer
- How manufacturing scales and how to accelerate it
Whether you work in academia, industry, or government, you can orient your work toward biosecurity. The career paths exist. The need is real.
For Policy Professionals
Technical solutions require policy implementation. The biosecurity field needs people who understand:
- How legislation and regulation are developed and implemented
- How international agreements are negotiated and enforced
- How government agencies function and how to make them more effective
- How private sector incentives work and how to align them with public interests
Your expertise in how institutions function is essential for translating technical capabilities into operational reality.
For Everyone
Even if biosecurity is not your primary profession, you can contribute:
- Stay informed: Follow developments in biological threats and biosecurity responses
- Support investment: Advocate for sustained pandemic preparedness funding
- Build trust: Combat misinformation about biological science and public health
- Engage locally: Support community health infrastructure and emergency preparedness
- Think globally: Recognize that your security depends on health security worldwide
The window for action is open. The technologies that could prevent the next pandemic exist or are in development. The institutional models work. The investment requirements are manageable. What is needed is sustained political will and sustained human effort.
This is not someone else’s problem. It is yours, and mine, and everyone’s. The biosecurity community needs more people, more perspectives, more energy. Whatever you bring, there is a place for you.
Conclusion: The Work Ahead
For the first time, we have the technological capability to detect and respond to biological threats before they become pandemics. We also face biological risks that could rival or exceed any previous catastrophe.
The outcome is not predetermined. It depends on decisions we make now about research governance, technology investment, institutional design, and international cooperation. It depends on whether we learn from the failures and successes documented in this handbook. It depends on whether we sustain attention and investment between crises rather than falling back into the “panic and neglect” cycle.
Throughout this handbook, the goal has been to provide a realistic assessment of both risks and opportunities. The threats are real, but they are not inevitable. The solutions are achievable, but they are not automatic. Success requires sustained effort from a growing community of practitioners, scientists, policymakers, and engaged citizens.
If this handbook has done its job, you now have the foundation to contribute to that effort. You understand the foundations of biosecurity, the pathogens of concern, the challenges posed by AI, and the governance frameworks that can help manage risk.
What remains is to use this knowledge. The future of biosecurity is not just something to be studied. It is something to be built.
In medicine, we have the Hippocratic oath: “First, do no harm.”
In biosecurity, a corollary might be: “First, pay attention.”
The threats we face are not invisible. The opportunities for intervention exist. The community of people working on these challenges is growing. By paying attention, staying engaged, and contributing what you can, you become part of the solution.
Welcome to the work.
What is the 100 Days Mission?
The Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI) aims to develop safe, effective vaccines against any new pathogen within 100 days of identification, compressing the COVID-19 timeline from 326 days. This requires pre-positioned platform technologies, pre-established manufacturing capacity, pre-approved regulatory pathways, and pre-planned distribution systems.
Which future scenario is most likely for biosecurity?
Muddling through is most likely without concerted effort. This scenario features incremental governance progress, occasional biological incidents that are contained after initial failures, uneven international cooperation, and investment that spikes after crises then declines. This reflects the historical pattern of crisis-driven response followed by complacency.
What key uncertainties will determine biosecurity’s future?
Critical uncertainties include whether AI lowers barriers faster than defenses improve, whether international cooperation survives geopolitical competition, whether pandemic preparedness investment is sustained between crises, and whether the biosecurity community attracts sufficient diverse talent to address the challenges.
How much would it cost to achieve pandemic prevention?
World Bank analysis suggests that $10.5 billion annually in additional spending could significantly reduce pandemic risk. This is less than 0.1% of global GDP and a fraction of COVID-19’s estimated $16 trillion total economic impact on the United States. The investment is manageable; the limiting factor is political will.
This chapter concludes The Biosecurity Handbook. For additional resources, see Appendix D: Further Reading and Resources.