Medical Countermeasures and Biodefense
Operation Warp Speed compressed COVID-19 vaccine development from the typical decade-plus timeline to 11 months, delivering safe and effective vaccines by December 2020 through parallel clinical trials, federal absorption of financial risk, and regulatory flexibility. Yet even this unprecedented acceleration allowed millions of deaths globally before vaccines reached populations at risk. CEPI’s 100-Day Mission now targets developing pandemic vaccines within 100 days of pathogen genome sequencing, recognizing that every week of delay in a fast-spreading respiratory pandemic translates to exponential growth in cases, deaths, and economic damage that no amount of post-deployment response can fully recover.
- Understand the Strategic National Stockpile’s role in biodefense preparedness.
- Evaluate vaccine development timelines and the 100-Day Mission.
- Analyze lessons from Operation Warp Speed and COVID-19 vaccine development.
- Recognize regulatory pathways for medical countermeasures (EUA, Animal Rule).
- Assess challenges in therapeutic countermeasure development, deployment, and equitable access.
- Understand emerging vaccine delivery innovations including nasal vaccines and mucosal immunity.
- Evaluate environmental countermeasures such as far-UVC technology for airborne pathogen reduction.
- Identify strategies for sustaining MCM readiness between crises.
Introduction
Medical countermeasures are pharmaceuticals, vaccines, diagnostics, and other medical products used to prevent, mitigate, or treat health threats from CBRN incidents and emerging infectious diseases. They’re the operational response tools after surveillance detects a threat (Outbreak Detection and Surveillance).
During COVID-19, public health departments struggled with the gap between detecting outbreaks through surveillance and having tools to respond effectively. In early 2020, genomic sequencing capacity could identify SARS-CoV-2 variants within days, but no vaccines existed, limited therapeutics were available, and supply chains for basic PPE were strained. That mismatch showed why medical countermeasure preparedness matters as much as surveillance capacity.
The Strategic National Stockpile: National Insurance Policy
History and Purpose
The Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) was established in 1999 as the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile, driven by concerns about bioterrorism preparedness. The 2001 anthrax attacks fundamentally reshaped its scope and capacity (ASPR).
The SNS serves as the nation’s repository of medical countermeasures for deployment to states and communities during public health emergencies threatening to overwhelm local resources. It contains antibiotics, vaccines, antivirals, antitoxins, antidotes, and medical supplies including PPE (ASPR TRACIE).
Contents and Capacity
For anthrax post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP): The SNS maintains sufficient antibiotics to provide prophylaxis for millions of people for 60 days, along with anthrax vaccine and antitoxin (Hendricks et al., 2014). This capacity expansion followed directives after the 2001 attacks exposed gaps.
For smallpox: Despite eradication in 1980, the SNS holds enough smallpox vaccine for nationwide vaccination if needed, plus therapeutics including TPOXX (tecovirimat) and brincidofovir (FDA).
For pandemic influenza: Antiviral medications (oseltamivir, zanamivir), PPE, and pandemic vaccine production capacity contracts.
COVID-19 Lessons
The pandemic stressed the SNS in unprecedented ways. Early demands for ventilators, PPE, and therapeutics occurred before stockpile planning assumed simultaneous nationwide needs. Supply chain disruptions, manufacturing constraints, and global competition for resources exposed structural limitations.
State health departments in early 2020 received SNS shipments that helped for days, not weeks. The stockpile design assumed deployment to one or two states, bridging a localized crisis, then restocking. COVID-19 meant deploying everywhere simultaneously for months. The SNS was critical for initial response but insufficient for sustained pandemic demands. State and local health departments needed months of supplies, not the 48-72 hour bridge the SNS was designed to provide.
During the first 3 months of 2020, the Strategic National Stockpile distributed approximately 12 million N95 face masks, 30 million other face masks, 6 million face shields, 5 million surgical gowns, 22,000 coveralls, and 16 million pairs of gloves; HHS OIG concluded that the stockpile could not meet COVID-19 demand and was not equipped for a national pandemic (HHS OIG, November 2023). The gap was not only a procurement failure. It exposed the difference between holding PPE inventory and maintaining protection that is approved, fitted, allocated, and available where exposure occurs.
Challenges
Maintenance costs: Medical countermeasures expire. Rotating inventory requires continuous procurement funding, competing with other public health priorities.
Uncertain threats: Stockpiling for unknown future pathogens requires flexibility in both contents and deployment mechanisms. Overspecialization for past threats (anthrax, smallpox) may not match actual emerging risks.
Distribution logistics: Moving stockpile assets to affected areas within 12 hours sounds straightforward until managing distribution across 50 states, territories, and tribal nations simultaneously, as COVID-19 demonstrated.
BARDA: Bridging the Development Valley
Mission and Approach
The Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA), established in 2006 as part of HHS, addresses the “valley of death” in medical countermeasure development where early promising research fails to reach late-stage development and FDA approval (BARDA).
BARDA provides funding, technical assistance, and regulatory expertise to advance MCMs addressing CBRN threats, pandemic influenza, and emerging infectious diseases. The model: de-risk development through public-private partnerships, enabling industry to invest where market incentives alone wouldn’t justify the cost.
Funding Mechanisms
BARDA uses grants, contracts, and other transaction authorities to support MCM development from advanced research through FDA approval and procurement for the SNS. Portfolio includes vaccines, therapeutics, diagnostics, and platform technologies.
During COVID-19, BARDA invested over $10 billion in vaccine development through Operation Warp Speed partnerships, supporting multiple candidates simultaneously to maximize probability of success (GAO, 2021).
Technical Support
Beyond funding, BARDA provides regulatory strategy expertise (many staff are former FDA reviewers), clinical trial design support, manufacturing scale-up guidance, and connections to the SNS and CDC for end-user requirements. This technical assistance helps smaller biotech companies navigate the complex MCM development pathway that larger pharmaceutical companies find unprofitable.
Vaccine Development: From Years to Months
Traditional Timeline
Pre-COVID-19, vaccine development typically required 10-15 years: exploratory research (2-4 years), preclinical development (1-2 years), Phase 1 safety trials (1-2 years), Phase 2 expanded trials (2-3 years), Phase 3 efficacy trials (2-4 years), regulatory review (1-2 years), manufacturing scale-up (1-2 years).
This timeline assumes sequential phases with pauses between for analysis, funding decisions, and manufacturing preparation.
Operation Warp Speed: Rapid Acceleration
Operation Warp Speed, launched May 2020, aimed to deliver 300 million doses of safe and effective COVID-19 vaccine by January 2021, compressing that decade-plus timeline into months (Slaoui & Hepburn, 2020).
Key strategies:
Parallel rather than sequential phases: Phase 1, 2, and 3 trials overlapped. Manufacturing scale-up began during Phase 3 trials, not after approval. Regulatory review occurred on a rolling basis as data became available.
Financial risk absorption: The federal government funded manufacturing at commercial scale before knowing if candidates would succeed. Companies built production capacity for multiple vaccine candidates simultaneously. If candidates failed, taxpayers absorbed the loss, eliminating industry financial risk.
Portfolio approach: Invested in six vaccine candidates using different platform technologies (mRNA, viral vector, protein subunit). Hedged against scientific and manufacturing uncertainties.
Regulatory flexibility: FDA provided extensive pre-submission interactions, real-time data review, and Emergency Use Authorization pathway for rapid deployment while maintaining safety standards.
Timeline achieved:
- January 2020: SARS-CoV-2 genome sequenced
- March 2020: Moderna Phase 1 trial begins (63 days after sequence published)
- July 2020: Pfizer/BioNTech and Moderna Phase 3 trials start
- December 11, 2020: Pfizer/BioNTech receives FDA EUA (11 months from genome sequence)
- December 18, 2020: Moderna receives FDA EUA
- December 14, 2020: First vaccinations administered
Estimated impact: Modeling studies suggest Operation Warp Speed vaccines prevented hundreds of thousands of deaths and hospitalizations in 2021, though exact figures depend on assumptions about counterfactual scenarios (Slaoui & Hepburn, 2020).
The 100-Day Mission
The Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI), a global partnership funding vaccine development for emerging infectious diseases, set an even more ambitious goal: develop safe, effective vaccines within 100 days of pathogen genome sequencing (CEPI).
Rationale: Even Operation Warp Speed’s 11-month timeline allowed millions of COVID-19 deaths and trillions in economic damage. Cutting response time to 100 days could save countless lives and reduce economic disruption in future pandemics.
Enabling strategies:
Prototype vaccine libraries: Pre-develop prototype vaccines for viral families (coronaviruses, influenzas, filoviruses, etc.) that can be rapidly adapted when new threats emerge within those families.
Platform technologies: mRNA and viral vector platforms allow rapid antigen swapping. Once the platform is validated, changing the target antigen is faster than developing entirely new vaccines.
Regulatory pathways: Streamlined clinical trial designs, harmonized international regulatory requirements, and acceptance of real-world evidence to accelerate approval.
Manufacturing capacity: Reserved production capacity at manufacturers globally, with pre-negotiated contracts for rapid scale-up.
Early pathogen characterization: Enhanced surveillance and rapid genomic sequencing to identify threats early.
Challenges: The 100-Day Mission requires sustained funding during inter-pandemic periods, international coordination across diverse regulatory systems, and ensuring equitable access for low- and middle-income countries. Success also depends on whether future pandemic pathogens belong to viral families with prototype vaccines already developed.
Nasal Vaccines and Mucosal Immunity
Current injectable COVID-19 vaccines generate systemic immunity but provide limited protection at the mucosal surfaces where respiratory infections begin. Mucosal vaccines, delivered via nasal spray or inhalation, aim to induce local immunity in the nose, throat, and lungs, potentially blocking infection and transmission rather than just preventing severe disease.
The biological rationale: Studies in humans and animals suggest mucosal immunity is more effective than systemic immunity in controlling replication of respiratory viruses at their entry points (NIH, 2024). Injectable vaccines excel at preventing severe disease once infection occurs, but mucosal vaccines could provide “sterilizing immunity” that prevents infection entirely.
Project NextGen investments: The $5 billion multi-agency Project NextGen initiative includes substantial funding for mucosal vaccine development (NIAID):
MPV/S-2P (NIAID): Phase 1 trial launched July 2024 using murine pneumonia virus vector to deliver SARS-CoV-2 spike protein via nasal spray. The vector naturally targets respiratory epithelial cells, generating both systemic antibodies and local mucosal immunity (NIH, 2024).
OCU500 (Ocugen): Selected by NIAID for trials comparing inhaled and intranasal delivery of a chimpanzee adenovirus-vectored vaccine. Earlier studies with similar technology demonstrated durable immune responses up to one year (Ocugen, 2024).
Additional candidates: Blue Lake Biotech/CyanVac began Phase 2b trials in December 2024; Vaxart’s oral viral vector vaccine is proceeding through Phase 2b.
Current status: Over 30 mucosal vaccine candidates have reached clinical trials globally, though some have been discontinued due to funding or technical challenges (Bastian, PLOS, August 2024). The technology remains experimental, with no mucosal COVID-19 vaccines yet approved in the US or Europe, though China and India have authorized intranasal vaccines domestically.
Practical advantages: Self-administered nasal sprays or inhalers could be mailed directly to households during pandemic response, eliminating the bottleneck of clinic-based administration by trained healthcare workers. This addresses a critical limitation exposed during COVID-19 vaccine rollout: the gap between manufacturing capacity and last-mile delivery capacity.
Regulatory Pathways for Medical Countermeasures
The Animal Rule
For MCMs addressing CBRN threats where human efficacy trials are unethical or infeasible (exposing people to anthrax or smallpox), the Animal Rule provides an alternative pathway (FDA).
Requirements:
- Reasonably well-understood pathophysiological mechanism
- Effectiveness demonstrated in animal models reasonably expected to predict human response
- Endpoint in animals clearly related to desired benefit in humans
- Safety data in humans sufficient to assess safety at intended doses
Anthrax vaccine and smallpox therapeutics stockpiled in the SNS were approved under the Animal Rule since conducting human efficacy trials would require deliberately infecting people with lethal pathogens.
Controversy: The Animal Rule’s lower evidentiary standard raises questions about confidence in effectiveness during actual deployment. If an anthrax attack occurs, will SNS countermeasures approved based solely on animal data actually work in humans? That uncertainty is the regulatory tradeoff for addressing threats we hope never materialize.
Public health officials preparing anthrax PEP plans must acknowledge to decision-makers that stockpiled countermeasures have never been tested for efficacy in humans. This creates messaging challenges: you want people to take prophylaxis seriously, but also can’t guarantee it works as well in people as in animal models. Transparency about uncertainty matters for maintaining trust, even when it complicates response messaging.
Therapeutic Countermeasures: The Bridge Before Vaccines
Monoclonal Antibodies
Monoclonal antibodies (mAbs) provide passive immunity, offering immediate protection or treatment without requiring the body’s immune response to develop. This makes them valuable for post-exposure prophylaxis and early treatment.
During COVID-19, neutralizing mAbs (bamlanivimab, sotrovimab, bebtelovimab, combinations) received EUAs for high-risk patients with mild-to-moderate disease. Early administration significantly reduced hospitalization risk (FDA COVID-19 Drugs).
Challenges:
- Variant susceptibility: As SARS-CoV-2 evolved, viral mutations reduced or eliminated effectiveness of several mAbs, requiring constant development of new formulations.
- Manufacturing constraints: mAb production requires complex biological manufacturing, limiting scale-up speed.
- Administration requirements: Intravenous or subcutaneous administration requires healthcare infrastructure, limiting deployment in resource-constrained settings.
- Cost: mAbs are expensive, creating equity and sustainability challenges.
Bamlanivimab received EUA November 2020 and showed strong efficacy against wild-type SARS-CoV-2. By January 2022, the FDA revoked authorization because Omicron mutations rendered it ineffective. Facilities that built infusion capacity around mAb protocols suddenly had treatments that didn’t work. This illustrated the arms race dynamic: viruses evolve faster than manufacturing can pivot. Planning for therapeutic obsolescence needs to be part of pandemic response strategies.
Environmental Countermeasures: GUV and Far-UVC
Medical countermeasures target pathogens after exposure or infection. Environmental countermeasures aim to prevent exposure in the first place, functioning like the sanitation infrastructure that eliminated waterborne cholera from developed nations. Germicidal ultraviolet (GUV), including upper-room UVGI and newer Far-UVC systems, should be understood as an air-treatment layer within a broader hierarchy of controls, not as a substitute for ventilation, filtration, vaccination, source control, or PPE (CDC/NIOSH GUV).
The Science of Far-UVC
Germicidal ultraviolet light has been used for water treatment for over a century and for air disinfection in healthcare settings since the 1940s. Conventional germicidal UV around 254 nm can inactivate airborne microorganisms but can damage human skin and eyes, restricting occupied-room use to designs such as upper-room UVGI, where ultraviolet energy is directed above the occupied zone. CDC/NIOSH guidance treats upper-room GUV as an established supplemental control for selected high-risk indoor settings, with qualified design, installation, testing, and maintenance required for safe operation (NIOSH, 2009, CDC/NIOSH GUV).
Far-UVC, often centered around 222 nm from krypton chloride excimer lamps, operates differently. These shorter wavelengths are strongly absorbed by proteins in the outermost layers of dead skin cells and the corneal surface, limiting penetration to living cells while still inactivating viruses and bacteria, which are too small for this shielding effect (Görlitz et al., 2023). That biophysical rationale supports Far-UVC research in occupied spaces, but it does not eliminate the need for exposure-limit compliance, wavelength filtering, ozone controls, and device-specific safety evidence.
Efficacy Evidence
Laboratory and chamber studies demonstrate substantial pathogen reduction, but those findings should not be read as clinical outcome evidence:
98.4% reduction of airborne Staphylococcus aureus within five minutes in a room-sized chamber, equivalent to 184 additional air changes per hour compared to mechanical ventilation alone (Eadie et al., 2022).
99.8% reduction of airborne infectious murine norovirus in an occupied animal-care facility using four ceiling-mounted 222 nm fixtures operating within current exposure guidelines (Buonanno et al., 2024).
Far-UVC inactivated aerosolized human coronaviruses OC43 and 229E in experimental studies, supporting research relevance for respiratory-virus control without establishing population-level effectiveness (Buonanno et al., 2020).
A randomized clinical trial of GUV appliances in long-term care common areas did not reduce the primary acute-respiratory-infection incidence rate per zone per cycle, although secondary time-trend analyses suggested fewer infections by study conclusion. That mixed result reinforces adjunct framing: environmental ultraviolet can support infection prevention, but chamber efficacy should not be translated directly into population-level protection claims (Shoubridge et al., 2025).
The Eadie room-sized chamber study is best read as translational evidence, not deployment proof. The authors used a controlled chamber with defined airflow, temperature, humidity, source release, and sampling to move beyond bench-scale inactivation, while explicitly noting that real-world evaluations remain necessary because laboratory inactivation does not necessarily translate into reduced disease transmission (Eadie et al., 2022).
Safety Profile
Current exposure guidelines from the International Commission on Non-Ionizing Radiation Protection (ICNIRP) set the threshold limit value at 23 mJ/cm² for 222 nm, higher than the 6 mJ/cm² limit for conventional 254 nm UV (ICNIRP). The CDC/NIOSH ventilation FAQ notes that ACGIH increased threshold limit values for 222 nm exposure after evidence that this wavelength does not penetrate the tear layer of the eye or the stratum corneum of the skin (CDC/NIOSH Ventilation FAQ).
Safety studies support these guidelines:
Long-term mouse studies found no increase in skin tumors or tissue abnormalities after repeated 222 nm exposure above then-applicable limits (Welch et al., 2023).
Rat corneal studies showed no adverse effects until exposures exceeded 3,500 mJ/cm², over 150 times the ICNIRP threshold limit (Kaidzu et al., 2021).
A 36-month clinical observation of far-UVC in occupied spaces found no ocular adverse events (Sugihara et al., 2025).
Far-UVC remains an emerging technology with important uncertainties. CDC/NIOSH describes whole-room GUV, commonly referred to as Far-UV, as promising but new and emerging, with unresolved questions about effectiveness in real occupied spaces when UV exposures are controlled to safe limits. Clinical claims should not be extrapolated from chamber reductions alone. Products that generate ozone require documented safety controls, and unfiltered or poorly filtered lamps may emit harmful longer wavelengths. FDA warnings about unsafe UV-C wands illustrate why device-specific radiation controls, labeling, and exposure safeguards matter. The technology should complement, not replace, ventilation, filtration, vaccination, PPE, and source control (CDC/NIOSH Ventilation FAQ, FDA Safety Communication, Blueprint Biosecurity, 2025).
In real rooms, the question is not only biological efficacy. It is whether the delivered ultraviolet field reaches the relevant air volume while staying within exposure limits. Even in the Eadie chamber, partial room irradiation left under-irradiated areas, and the authors warned that larger rooms with poorer mixing may have lower pathogen reduction. Temperature, humidity, ventilation rate, air mixing, and proximity to an infectious source remain material variables for field performance (Eadie et al., 2022). Earlier healthcare UVGI reviews reached the same control-hierarchy conclusion: UVGI can be microbiocidal, but should be treated as an adjunct to HVAC, contaminant removal, maintenance, cleaning, and disinfection rather than as a primary stand-alone intervention (Memarzadeh et al., 2010).
Implementation Considerations
For handbook purposes, the implementation question is governance and procurement rather than fixture placement. Facility leaders should require independent safety and performance documentation, wavelength filtering evidence for 222 nm systems, ozone-control documentation where relevant, and qualified commissioning that verifies the system performs safely under as-used conditions. CDC/NIOSH recommends consultation with reputable GUV professionals before installation and emphasizes that GUV is supplemental to required ventilation and filtration, not a replacement for them (CDC/NIOSH GUV, CDC/NIOSH Ventilation FAQ).
Procurement review should ask for evidence in the target use case: room geometry, occupancy pattern, source-location assumptions, ventilation and mixing conditions, maintenance plan, and exposure-limit basis. A device that performs well in a controlled chamber may still underperform in a larger, irregular, poorly mixed, or poorly maintained occupied space.
Cost-effectiveness: Current lamp costs limit deployment primarily to high-risk settings like healthcare facilities, schools, and transit hubs. BARDA’s Patch Forward Prize and similar initiatives are developing next-generation delivery technologies; similar investment in far-UVC manufacturing could reduce costs substantially (Blueprint Biosecurity, 2025).
Pandemic preparedness value: Unlike vaccines or therapeutics, Far-UVC and other environmental air-treatment systems can be physically pre-positioned before a pathogen-specific countermeasure exists. The readiness question is not simply whether devices have been purchased; it is whether they have been independently validated, maintained, and integrated with ventilation, filtration, PPE, and other infection-prevention layers.
Challenges in MCM Development and Deployment
Poor Economic Incentives
MCMs for rare or theoretical threats face market failure. No predictable revenue stream exists for bioterrorism countermeasures. Even pandemic vaccines have uncertain timing and duration of demand.
Pharmaceutical companies prioritize blockbuster drugs treating chronic conditions in large, definable patient populations. MCM development, requiring hundreds of millions of dollars over a decade with no guarantee of commercial payoff, competes poorly for R&D investment (Battelle, 2017).
Consequences: Smaller biotech companies develop most MCMs through government contracts rather than commercial intent. When government funding ends or priorities shift, development programs often stall.
Manufacturing Capacity Constraints
COVID-19 exposed manufacturing bottlenecks: limited raw materials, specialized equipment, trained workforce, and validated production lines. Building capacity is expensive and requires sustained utilization to remain economically viable.
After pandemic emergencies end, maintaining expanded manufacturing capacity without federal subsidies becomes unsustainable. Companies scale back, leaving future pandemics to repeat the same capacity challenges.
Equitable Access Gaps
The COVID-19 vaccine distribution starkly demonstrated global equity challenges. High-income countries pre-purchased billions of doses, while LMICs waited months for access (Usher, 2021).
International frameworks like COVAX aimed to address this but struggled with funding, supply, and political will. Ensuring equitable MCM access during future pandemics requires technology transfer, distributed manufacturing capacity, tiered pricing agreements, and binding international commitments.
Global vaccine inequity isn’t just unfair; it’s epidemiologically counterproductive. Unvaccinated populations serve as reservoirs for continued transmission and variant emergence. Omicron emerged in southern Africa during a period of low vaccine coverage. Protecting high-income countries while leaving LMIC populations unvaccinated creates conditions for variants that escape immunity globally. True pandemic response requires equitable access as a core strategy, not an afterthought.
Readiness During Inter-Pandemic Periods
Sustaining MCM programs between crises is politically and financially difficult. Funding competes with immediate public health needs. Expertise disperses when programs end. Manufacturing capacity downsizes.
Then the next pandemic strikes, and we rediscover that preparedness requires continuous investment, not reactive scrambling. The challenge is maintaining urgency for low-probability, high-consequence events that may not occur for years or decades.
Advancing biological capabilities, from synthetic biology to democratized biotechnology, create new dual-use challenges that MCMs must be prepared to address (see Synthetic Biology and Democratization).
What is the Strategic National Stockpile?
The Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) is the nation’s federal repository of medical countermeasures, established in 1999. It contains antibiotics, vaccines, antivirals, antitoxins, antidotes, and medical supplies including PPE for deployment during public health emergencies. The SNS maintains sufficient antibiotics for anthrax post-exposure prophylaxis for millions of people, smallpox vaccines for nationwide vaccination, and pandemic influenza antivirals.
How did Operation Warp Speed accelerate COVID-19 vaccine development?
Operation Warp Speed compressed vaccine development from 10+ years to 11 months through parallel (rather than sequential) clinical trial phases, federal absorption of financial risk for manufacturing scale-up before approval, a portfolio approach funding multiple vaccine candidates simultaneously, and regulatory flexibility with rolling review processes. The first COVID-19 vaccine received FDA Emergency Use Authorization in December 2020, just 11 months after the SARS-CoV-2 genome was sequenced.
What is CEPI’s 100-Day Mission?
The Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI) has set a goal to develop safe, effective vaccines within 100 days of pathogen genome sequencing. This requires prototype vaccine libraries for viral families, platform technologies like mRNA that allow rapid antigen swapping, streamlined regulatory pathways, reserved global manufacturing capacity, and enhanced surveillance systems. Even Operation Warp Speed’s 11-month timeline allowed millions of COVID-19 deaths, making the 100-day target critical for future pandemic response.
What is BARDA’s role in medical countermeasure development?
The Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) bridges the “valley of death” in medical countermeasure development by providing funding, technical assistance, and regulatory expertise to advance MCMs from research through FDA approval. BARDA supports development for CBRN threats, pandemic influenza, and emerging infectious diseases through public-private partnerships, de-risking development for threats with poor commercial market incentives.
This chapter is part of The Biosecurity Handbook.