The Biological Weapons Convention and International Governance
The Soviet Union maintained an offensive biological weapons program employing over 60,000 people across dozens of facilities throughout its BWC membership. Biopreparat weaponized anthrax, plague, and smallpox for 17 years while submitting no Confidence-Building Measures that revealed its existence. Iraq developed biological weapons as a BWC State Party. The treaty detected nothing. Every major violation was discovered through defectors, intelligence, or post-conflict inspections, never through BWC mechanisms. Six years of negotiations for a verification protocol collapsed in 2001 when the United States rejected inspections, and no serious attempt to revive binding verification has occurred since.
- Understand the BWC treaty structure and key articles
- Recognize verification limitations and the 2001 protocol collapse
- Evaluate confidence-building measures and implementation challenges
- Assess gaps in international biosecurity governance
Introduction
The Biological Weapons Convention should work in theory. One hundred eighty-nine States Parties. First multilateral disarmament treaty to ban an entire class of WMDs (UN ODA, ICRC).
In practice, the BWC is the weakest of the major WMD treaties. No verification mechanism. No inspections. No monitoring. No penalties for violations. Just voluntary confidence-building measures that half of States Parties don’t bother submitting (UN ODA CBM, BWC Implementation Resource).
Colleagues in countries with minimal biosecurity capacity often treat BWC obligations as an afterthought. No dedicated staff. No budget. A single person handling CBM submissions in addition to their regular job, if submissions happen at all.
This chapter examines the BWC treaty structure, the collapse of verification negotiations, current implementation support mechanisms, and major gaps in international biological security governance.
The BWC Treaty Structure
Origins and Entry into Force
Negotiations for prohibiting biological weapons began in the 1960s. The 1925 Geneva Protocol banned use of biological weapons but not development or possession (ICRC). The BWC aimed to close that gap.
The Convention opened for signature on April 10, 1972, in London, Moscow, and Washington simultaneously, and entered into force on March 26, 1975, after ratification by 22 states (UN ODA). As of 2025, 189 States Parties have joined (including Comoros and Kiribati, which acceded in 2025), making it near-universal.
Article I: Core Prohibition
Article I contains the central obligation (UN ODA, ICRC):
“Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain: (1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes; (2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.”
The key phrase is “types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes.” This allows research for vaccines, treatments, diagnostics, and defensive measures while prohibiting offensive weapons programs.
But it’s vague. What constitutes “protective” research? Defensive bioweapons programs require understanding how to create offensive agents. The line blurs.
Article II: Destruction
Article II requires States Parties to destroy or divert to peaceful purposes all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment, and means of delivery covered by Article I within nine months of the Convention entering into force for that State Party (UN ODA).
No verification mechanism existed to confirm destruction. States self-declare compliance.
Article III: Transfer Prohibition
Article III prohibits transfer of agents, toxins, weapons, equipment, or means of delivery to any recipient and assisting, encouraging, or inducing anyone to manufacture or acquire them (UN ODA).
This provision theoretically prevents proliferation. Again, no verification.
Article V: Consultation and Cooperation
Article V establishes consultation and cooperation mechanisms for resolving concerns about compliance (UN ODA, ICRC). States Parties “undertake to consult one another and to cooperate in solving any problems” related to Convention objectives or application.
In practice, this means Review Conferences every five years and intersessional meetings. No binding dispute resolution.
What the BWC Lacks
Critically, the BWC has:
NO declarations of biological facilities or activities (unlike Chemical Weapons Convention).
NO inspections or site visits to verify compliance.
NO monitoring or challenge inspection mechanisms.
NO international organization to oversee implementation (unlike Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons for CWC).
NO penalties for non-compliance or withdrawal.
This makes it the weakest major arms control treaty. Compliance depends entirely on good faith and voluntary transparency through confidence-building measures.
The 2001 Verification Protocol Collapse
Background: Six Years of Negotiations
From 1995 to 2001, an Ad Hoc Group (AHG) negotiated a legally binding protocol to strengthen BWC verification (Arms Control Association, NTI). The goal: create inspection and monitoring mechanisms similar to the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Negotiations involved site declarations, visits to declared facilities, challenge investigations of suspected violations, and transparency measures (Arms Control Association).
After six years and 24 sessions, Chair Ambassador Tibor Toth of Hungary introduced a 210-page “composite text” in March 2001, attempting to bridge outstanding issues and provide compromise solutions (Arms Control Association, NTI).
July 2001: U.S. Rejection
In July 2001, the Bush administration rejected the protocol outright (Arms Control Association, NTI).
U.S. arguments:
Biodefense compromise: Proposed inspection regime could reveal legitimate U.S. biodefense research, compromising national security.
Trade secret concerns: Inspections of pharmaceutical and biotechnology facilities would expose proprietary information without adequate protection.
Ineffectiveness: Protocol wouldn’t detect dedicated bioweapons programs. Iraq, North Korea, and Soviet Union had violated treaties despite verification mechanisms.
Better alternatives: U.S. proposed alternative measures: criminal legislation, disease surveillance, codes of conduct for scientists, export controls.
The rejection was unilateral and non-negotiable. Other States Parties, particularly U.S. allies, were blindsided (NTI).
November 2001: Fifth Review Conference Suspended
The Fifth BWC Review Conference in November 2001 could not reach consensus on a Final Declaration owing to the U.S. position (Arms Control Association). The conference was suspended for one year, an unprecedented step.
When resumed in 2002, States Parties agreed only to annual meetings focusing on specific topics. No verification protocol. No formal negotiating mandate (NTI).
Long-Term Consequences
The protocol collapse had lasting effects:
Verification politically dead: No serious attempt to revive binding verification since 2001. The 9th Review Conference (2022) established a Working Group that could discuss compliance and verification, but this is consultative, not binding (UNIDIR, PRIF).
Treaty weakness cemented: Without verification, BWC remains entirely dependent on voluntary compliance and transparency.
Precedent for withdrawal: U.S. rejection demonstrated that a major power could torpedo multilateral arms control without consequence.
Lost opportunity: Post-9/11 and post-anthrax letters was arguably the best political moment for biosecurity emphasis. The window closed.
Biosecurity colleagues who worked on the protocol negotiations describe what went wrong. The consistent answer: U.S. pharmaceutical and biotech industry lobbying, combined with Pentagon concerns about exposing biodefense programs, killed it. National commercial and security interests trumped global security governance.
Confidence-Building Measures
Purpose and Structure
In the absence of verification, the BWC relies on Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs), voluntary annual reports submitted by States Parties to promote transparency and reduce suspicions (UN ODA).
CBMs were introduced in 1987 and cover six areas:
CBM A: Research centers and national biological defense programs.
CBM B: Outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar unusual occurrences caused by toxins that deviate from normal patterns.
CBM C: Encouragement of publication of results and promotion of knowledge use.
CBM E: Declaration of legislation, regulations, and measures related to BWC implementation.
CBM F: Declaration of past offensive and/or defensive biological programs.
CBM G: Declaration of vaccine production facilities.
States Parties submit annual CBM reports to the Implementation Support Unit by April 15 each year, covering the previous calendar year (UN ODA).
Participation Challenges
CBM participation has remained persistently low, typically around 50% of States Parties (UN ODA CBM, BWC Implementation Resource).
Reasons for non-submission:
Resource and capacity constraints: Many countries lack dedicated biosecurity staff. Collecting information across multiple ministries (health, defense, agriculture) proves difficult.
Lack of awareness: Many States Parties are unaware of CBM benefits or submission requirements.
Low perceived value: Since CBMs are not legally binding and face no consequences for non-submission, they receive low priority.
Data sensitivity concerns: Some countries worry about revealing sensitive information, even though CBMs are designed to be reassuring, not revealing.
Coordination challenges: Establishing networks of domestic stakeholders for data collection can be daunting in countries with limited inter-agency cooperation.
The Implementation Support Unit actively works to increase participation through guidance, technical assistance, and the eCBM online platform (UN ODA ISU, UN ODA CBM). But fundamental issues remain: CBMs are voluntary, not legally binding, and carry zero accountability.
Data Quality Issues
Even when submitted, CBM reports often have quality problems (UN ODA CBM, BWC Implementation Resource):
Incomplete submissions: Many reports leave sections blank or provide minimal information.
Inconsistency: Reporting format and detail levels vary widely between countries.
Lack of updates: Some countries submit identical reports year after year without updates.
Translation issues: Reports submitted in non-UN languages may not be widely accessible.
CBMs were meant to build confidence. When half of States Parties don’t submit them and the other half submit reports of varying quality, the confidence-building function fails.
The Implementation Support Unit
Establishment and Mandate
The BWC Implementation Support Unit (ISU) was established in 2006, located within the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs in Geneva (UN ODA, Cambridge University Press).
Its mandate includes:
Providing administrative support for BWC meetings (Review Conferences, Meetings of States Parties, intersessional meetings).
Facilitating communication among States Parties.
Managing CBM submissions through the eCBM platform.
Providing guidance and assistance on national implementation.
Supporting universalization efforts (encouraging non-States Parties to join).
Organizing capacity-building workshops for national focal points.
Resource Constraints
The ISU is small. As of 2025, it has four professional staff members (Cambridge University Press). This is insufficient for supporting 189 States Parties in implementing a global nonproliferation treaty.
For comparison, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which oversees the Chemical Weapons Convention, has over 500 staff members and a budget exceeding €70 million annually. The BWC ISU operates on a fraction of that, with consistent funding challenges.
The Ninth Review Conference (2022) extended the ISU mandate until 2027 and added one additional staff position (UNIDIR, VERTIC). This was viewed as progress, though still inadequate for the scope of work required.
Achievements Despite Limitations
Despite constraints, the ISU has accomplished meaningful work:
eCBM Platform: Developed online system allowing States Parties to submit CBMs electronically, improving accessibility (UN ODA).
Capacity Building: Organized workshops for national contact points, providing training on national implementation, CBM preparation, and biosecurity best practices (UN ODA).
Technical Assistance: Offered guidance to States Parties needing help with legislation, CBM preparation, or establishing national implementation structures.
Information Hub: Compiled and distributed BWC-related information, background documents, and national implementation examples.
The ISU does good work with limited resources. But it can’t compensate for the BWC’s structural weaknesses: no verification, no compliance monitoring, no enforcement mechanisms.
Review Conferences and Intersessional Work
Five-Year Cycle
BWC Review Conferences occur every five years to assess Convention implementation, consider scientific and technological developments relevant to the treaty, and agree on future work programs (UN ODA).
Conferences have varied effectiveness. Some produce substantive agreements. Others (like the 8th in 2016) result in minimal outcomes owing to political deadlock (CBW Events).
Eighth Review Conference (2016): Minimal Progress
The Eighth Review Conference produced an “extremely weak” Final Document with no inter-sessional work beyond annual meetings and ISU extension (CBW Events, Arms Control Association). Many delegates expressed anger at this outcome, describing it as an “abuse of consensus.”
The conference reflected deep divisions among States Parties about BWC priorities and direction. Without consensus on substantive topics, minimal progress was possible.
Ninth Review Conference (2022): Modest Success
The Ninth Review Conference (November-December 2022) was viewed as a “modest success” despite challenging geopolitics (Russia-Ukraine war, COVID-19 pandemic) (UNIDIR, PRIF, VERTIC).
Key outcomes:
Working Group established: First time since 2001 that compliance and verification returned to the BWC agenda through a formal subsidiary body (UNIDIR, PRIF). The Working Group has limited consultative mandate, not negotiating authority, but represents progress.
ISU strengthened: Mandate extended to 2027 with one additional staff position (VERTIC).
Intersessional program: Mandates for work on international cooperation and assistance, and scientific and technological developments.
The conference demonstrated that even in difficult political environments, incremental progress remains possible when States Parties commit to constructive engagement.
Historical Violations and Detection Failures
The lack of BWC verification mechanisms isn’t just a theoretical concern. Major violations occurred and went undetected by treaty mechanisms, discovered only through intelligence, defectors, or post-conflict inspections.
Soviet Biopreparat: Massive Covert Program
The Soviet Union maintained an enormous offensive biological weapons program throughout its BWC membership (1975-1992) (FAS, FAS 1998). Biopreparat employed over 60,000 people across dozens of facilities, developing weaponized anthrax, plague, smallpox, and novel engineered agents (Alibek & Handelman, 1999; FAS).
The program remained completely hidden from BWC mechanisms. No CBMs revealed it. No inspections detected it. Western intelligence suspected Soviet violations but lacked proof.
Only defections revealed the truth. Vladimir Pasechnik defected in 1989, followed by Ken Alibek (Kanatjan Alibekov), First Deputy Director of Biopreparat, in 1992 (Alibek & Handelman, 1999; FAS). Their testimony exposed the program’s scale: industrial-scale anthrax production, weaponized smallpox variants, antibiotic-resistant plague strains, and research into combinatorial agents.
The BWC had been in force for over 15 years during Biopreparat’s peak activity. The treaty did nothing to prevent, detect, or stop the world’s largest bioweapons program.
Iraq: BWC State Party with Active Program
Iraq ratified the BWC in 1991, while simultaneously operating an offensive biological weapons program (NTI). The program, which began in the 1980s, produced anthrax, botulinum toxin, and aflatoxin, with weaponization efforts including aerial bombs and missile warheads.
BWC mechanisms detected none of this. Iraq’s violations were revealed only through UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspections following the 1991 Gulf War, not through any BWC compliance measure (NTI). Iraq had exploited the dual-use nature of biological research, the absence of BWC declarations, and zero verification to develop weapons while nominally complying with the treaty.
Sverdlovsk Anthrax Leak (1979): Concealment Success
In April 1979, an accidental release of weaponized anthrax from a Soviet military facility in Sverdlovsk (now Yekaterinburg) killed at least 66 people, possibly more (Meselson et al., 1994, Science 266:1202-1208). This was a clear BWC violation (offensive bioweapons production).
The Soviet government denied it for over a decade, claiming the deaths resulted from contaminated meat, a natural outbreak (Meselson et al., 1994). Only after the Soviet Union collapsed did Russian President Boris Yeltsin acknowledge in 1992 that the outbreak was caused by a military facility accident.
Western intelligence suspected the truth but couldn’t prove it through BWC mechanisms, which offered no investigative authority. An epidemiological study eventually confirmed the aerosol release pattern (Meselson et al., 1994), but this came years after the event and only became possible with Russian cooperation post-1991.
The incident demonstrated that even catastrophic accidents involving treaty violations can be concealed when no verification or investigation mechanisms exist.
Lessons from Historical Violations
Every major detected BWC violation was discovered through means external to the treaty: defectors, post-conflict inspections, or eventual government admissions. The BWC itself detected nothing.
Colleagues who worked in arms control during this period express consistent frustration: they knew violations were occurring but the treaty provided zero tools to prove it, investigate, or compel compliance. Intelligence could suggest violations but couldn’t substitute for treaty verification. The political will for verification collapsed long before the evidence of violations became public.
Complementary International Frameworks
While the BWC remains the primary international legal instrument prohibiting biological weapons, several complementary frameworks address related biosecurity concerns.
UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)
UN Security Council Resolution 1540, adopted unanimously in 2004, addresses a critical gap the BWC doesn’t explicitly cover: proliferation to non-state actors.
Key provisions:
Binding obligations: Unlike the BWC’s voluntary provisions, UNSCR 1540 is binding on all UN member states under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
Non-state actor focus: Requires states to refrain from providing any form of support to non-state actors attempting to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer, or use nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their delivery systems.
Domestic legislation mandate: States must adopt and enforce appropriate laws prohibiting non-state actors from engaging in WMD-related activities.
Physical protection requirements: Requires accountable systems to secure sensitive materials and prevent illicit trafficking.
Implementation:
The 1540 Committee monitors implementation and provides assistance to states. As of 2025, all UN member states have submitted at least one implementation report, though quality and completeness vary significantly. Many developing states lack capacity to fully implement physical protection and export control requirements.
Biosecurity significance:
UNSCR 1540 complements the BWC by addressing the bioterrorism threat explicitly. While the BWC prohibits state bioweapons programs, 1540 requires states to prevent non-state actors from accessing dangerous biological materials and knowledge. The 2001 anthrax letter attacks and Aum Shinrikyo’s biological program attempts demonstrated that this threat is not hypothetical.
The Australia Group
The Australia Group is an informal multilateral export control arrangement established in 1985 following intelligence that Iraq had used chemical weapons supplied by companies in several Western countries during the Iran-Iraq War. Named after its first meeting location in Australia, the group has evolved to address biological as well as chemical proliferation risks.
Membership:
As of 2025, the Australia Group comprises 43 participating countries plus the European Commission. Participation is informal and based on like-minded commitment to nonproliferation, not treaty obligations. Notable non-members include China, India, and Pakistan.
How it works:
Participating countries harmonize national export controls for:
Biological agents: Human, animal, and plant pathogens on the Common Control Lists, including bacteria (Bacillus anthracis, Yersinia pestis, Francisella tularensis), viruses (variola, Ebola, SARS-CoV), and toxins (botulinum, ricin).
Dual-use biological equipment: Fermenters, freeze dryers, spray dryers, protective/containment equipment, and related technology capable of culturing or processing biological agents.
Related technologies: Technical data and assistance that could contribute to biological weapons programs.
Export licensing:
Exporters in Australia Group countries must obtain licenses before transferring controlled items. Licensing authorities deny transfers when there’s concern items may contribute to biological or chemical weapons programs, even for ostensibly peaceful applications.
Catch-all controls:
Most participants implement “catch-all” provisions allowing denial of exports even for non-listed items if there’s suspicion of weapons program diversion. This addresses the rapid pace of biotechnology development where new dual-use technologies emerge faster than lists can be updated.
Limitations:
The Australia Group is not a treaty. No binding legal obligations. No verification. Membership is limited to like-minded states. Non-members can freely export controlled items, creating gaps in the global export control network. China and India’s absence is particularly significant given their growing biotechnology manufacturing capacity.
Effectiveness:
Despite limitations, the Australia Group represents the most extensive multilateral biological export control framework. The harmonized control lists serve as de facto international standards, with some non-member states voluntarily adopting similar controls. Export denials have demonstrably prevented proliferation in documented cases, though successful interdictions remain classified.
China’s Biosecurity Law (2021)
China’s Biosecurity Law, adopted October 2020 and effective April 15, 2021, represents a significant development in national biosecurity governance outside Western frameworks. The law establishes biosecurity as a component of national security and creates a complete domestic regulatory structure.
Key provisions:
- Scope: Covers major infectious diseases, animal/plant epidemics, biotechnology research oversight, pathogenic microbe laboratory management, human genetic resources, alien species invasion, antimicrobial resistance, and bioterrorism prevention
- Prohibited activities: Development, manufacture, acquisition, storage, or use of biological weapons
- Biosafety requirements: Enhanced laboratory safety standards and pathogen management
- International cooperation: Explicit commitment to participate in global biosecurity governance
Significance for international biosecurity:
China is not a member of the Australia Group and has historically viewed Western-led export control regimes with suspicion. The Biosecurity Law provides an alternative national framework that, in principle, addresses many of the same concerns. Whether implementation matches stated intent remains difficult to assess from outside, a limitation familiar from other national biosecurity systems.
The law’s framing of biosecurity as a national security priority reflects the post-COVID-19 environment and may indicate increased Chinese engagement with these issues, though transparency about research activities and outbreak origins remains a point of international contention.
Gaps in International Biological Security Governance
No Binding Verification
The fundamental gap: no mechanism to verify compliance (Arms Control Association). States can develop offensive bioweapons programs with minimal risk of detection if they take basic operational security precautions.
The Chemical Weapons Convention demonstrates that arms control verification is achievable for similar dual-use technologies. But without political will, the BWC will remain unverified.
Limited Enforcement
Even if violations were detected through intelligence or other means, the BWC provides no enforcement mechanisms. No penalties. No sanctions authority. Just consultation under Article V (UN ODA).
States Parties can lodge formal complaints through the UN Security Council if they believe another State Party has violated the Convention, but this is a political process subject to veto.
Inadequate Resources
The ISU’s tiny budget and four-person professional staff cannot adequately support 189 States Parties in implementation (Cambridge University Press). Many countries receive no meaningful assistance with national biosecurity capacity development.
The BWC consistently ranks as one of the lowest-resourced international security mechanisms relative to the threats it addresses.
No International Organization
Unlike the Chemical Weapons Convention (OPCW) or Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (IAEA), the BWC has no dedicated international organization (Arms Control Association). This limits technical assistance, verification capacity, and institutional memory.
Proposals for a BWC organization have surfaced repeatedly but face political and financial opposition.
Scientific and Technological Outpacing
Synthetic biology, gene editing, and AI-enabled biological design are advancing faster than BWC review processes can address (UNIDIR). The five-year Review Conference cycle cannot keep pace with exponential technology development.
This creates a widening gap between what the BWC prohibits and what technologies enable states or non-state actors to do.
The next chapter examines biosurveillance and early warning systems: detecting biological threats before they become catastrophic, regardless of whether they emerge naturally, accidentally, or deliberately. Strong surveillance can compensate partially for weak governance by enabling rapid response.
This chapter is part of The Biosecurity Handbook.