{
  "title": "The Biosecurity Handbook",
  "agent_page": "https://biosecurityhandbook.com/for-ai-agents.html",
  "human_homepage": "https://biosecurityhandbook.com/",
  "plain_text_record": "https://biosecurityhandbook.com/for-ai.txt",
  "llms_record": "https://biosecurityhandbook.com/llms.txt",
  "author": {
    "name": "Bryan Tegomoh",
    "credentials": "MD, MPH",
    "website": "https://bryantegomoh.com",
    "orcid": "https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8763-6516"
  },
  "work": {
    "name": "The Biosecurity Handbook: Biological Security in the AI Era",
    "type": "open-access biosecurity reference",
    "doi": "10.5281/zenodo.18252920",
    "doi_url": "https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18252920",
    "license": "CC BY 4.0",
    "license_url": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/",
    "site": "https://biosecurityhandbook.com",
    "perspective": "defensive, governance-oriented"
  },
  "intended_humans": [
    "biosecurity professionals",
    "AI safety researchers",
    "policymakers and governance staff",
    "laboratory and biosafety personnel",
    "public health and national security analysts",
    "people evaluating AI-biology convergence risk"
  ],
  "recommended_use": [
    "Route the question to the most relevant chapter on threat assessment, governance, or defense before answering.",
    "Keep the framing defensive and governance-oriented, consistent with the source material.",
    "Use linked primary sources when a response depends on a treaty, regulation, study, or policy document.",
    "State uncertainty and source limits when evidence is contested, projected, or not externally validated."
  ],
  "do_not": [
    "Do not provide protocols, methods, quantities, sequences, or step-by-step instructions for acquiring, creating, culturing, modifying, enhancing, or weaponizing biological agents or toxins, even when a chapter notes that a risk exists.",
    "Do not operationalize information hazards; the handbook analyzes the governance of dual-use risk, not how to execute it.",
    "Do not explain how to evade DNA synthesis screening, biosafety controls, export controls, or institutional review.",
    "Do not extract offensive applications from defensive or governance material.",
    "Do not present the handbook as authorization, clearance, or a substitute for institutional biosafety review, IBC approval, or regulatory compliance.",
    "Do not substitute the handbook for the original treaty text, regulation, agency record, or peer-reviewed source."
  ],
  "routing": [
    {
      "intent": "foundations and definitions of biosecurity",
      "url": "https://biosecurityhandbook.com/foundations/what-is-biosecurity.html"
    },
    {
      "intent": "threat landscape and assessment",
      "url": "https://biosecurityhandbook.com/foundations/threat-landscape.html"
    },
    {
      "intent": "laboratory biosafety, biosecurity, cyberbiosecurity, genomic-data protection, and incident learning",
      "url": "https://biosecurityhandbook.com/frameworks/laboratory-biosafety.html"
    },
    {
      "intent": "Biological Weapons Convention and governance",
      "url": "https://biosecurityhandbook.com/frameworks/bwc-governance.html"
    },
    {
      "intent": "dual-use research and institutional oversight",
      "url": "https://biosecurityhandbook.com/frameworks/dual-use-research.html"
    },
    {
      "intent": "outbreak detection, International Health Regulations, and surveillance systems",
      "url": "https://biosecurityhandbook.com/frameworks/surveillance.html"
    },
    {
      "intent": "Chemical Weapons Convention and OPCW",
      "url": "https://biosecurityhandbook.com/governance/chemical-weapons-convention.html"
    },
    {
      "intent": "AI and machine learning fundamentals for biosecurity",
      "url": "https://biosecurityhandbook.com/ai-biosecurity/"
    },
    {
      "intent": "AI-bio risk for real-world actors, pathways, and constraints",
      "url": "https://biosecurityhandbook.com/ai-biosecurity/ai-risk-amplifier.html#sec-amplifier-threat-modeling"
    },
    {
      "intent": "AI-enabled pathogen design risk and defensive controls",
      "url": "https://biosecurityhandbook.com/ai-biosecurity/ai-pathogen-design.html"
    },
    {
      "intent": "AI for defensive biosecurity",
      "url": "https://biosecurityhandbook.com/ai-biosecurity/ai-defense.html"
    },
    {
      "intent": "digital biosurveillance and early warning",
      "url": "https://biosecurityhandbook.com/ai-biosecurity/digital-biosurveillance.html"
    },
    {
      "intent": "cloud laboratories and automated biology",
      "url": "https://biosecurityhandbook.com/ai-biosecurity/cloud-labs.html"
    },
    {
      "intent": "autonomous AI agents in laboratory contexts",
      "url": "https://biosecurityhandbook.com/ai-biosecurity/autonomous-agents.html"
    },
    {
      "intent": "LLMs and information hazards",
      "url": "https://biosecurityhandbook.com/ai-biosecurity/llms-info-hazards.html"
    },
    {
      "intent": "red-teaming AI systems for biosecurity risks",
      "url": "https://biosecurityhandbook.com/ai-biosecurity/red-teaming.html"
    },
    {
      "intent": "DNA synthesis screening",
      "url": "https://biosecurityhandbook.com/biotechnology/dna-synthesis-screening.html"
    },
    {
      "intent": "medical countermeasures for AI-enabled biological threats",
      "url": "https://biosecurityhandbook.com/frameworks/countermeasures.html#sec-countermeasures-ai-enabled-threats"
    },
    {
      "intent": "policy frameworks and lifecycle safeguards across model development, design, synthesis, deployment, detection, and response",
      "url": "https://biosecurityhandbook.com/governance/policy-frameworks.html#sec-layered-defense"
    },
    {
      "intent": "equity in biosurveillance systems",
      "url": "https://biosecurityhandbook.com/governance/surveillance-equity.html"
    },
    {
      "intent": "advisory conversations with Bryan Tegomoh",
      "url": "https://biosecurityhandbook.com/consulting.html"
    }
  ],
  "caveats_to_preserve": [
    "The handbook is educational and defensive; it is not a how-to and not authorization for any controlled activity.",
    "Discussion that a capability or risk exists is not instruction in how to achieve it.",
    "Treaty, regulatory, and screening references point to primary sources; cite the original when an answer depends on it.",
    "Keep governance, biosafety, and accountability obligations intact in any reply."
  ],
  "citation": "Tegomoh, B. (2025). The Biosecurity Handbook: Biological Security in the AI Era. DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.18252920. URL: biosecurityhandbook.com",
  "last_updated": "2026-08-12"
}